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RECASTING VICARIOUS LIABILITY
PHILLIP MORGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the Government’s rhetoric on the Big Society it is now time
to review a number of legal doctrines from the perspective of the
phenomenon of volunteering. Volunteers contribute significantly to the
United Kingdom’s GDP, between 2–3% according to the European
Union.1 As reported by a Department for Communities and Local
Government survey, a significant proportion of adults in the United
Kingdom volunteer.2 A volunteering industry has developed.3 The
Government as part of its Big Society project has encouraged vo-
lunteering organisations to provide services which were traditionally
delivered by paid employees of the state or local authorities.4 Voluntary
organisations also compete amongst themselves, and with commercial
concerns for contracts to deliver services on a commercial basis, al-
though the service itself may be delivered by unpaid volunteers. For
example, a volunteer staffed Legal Advice Centre may hold a contract
with the Legal Services Commission and use paid employees and vo-
lunteers working alongside one another to fulfil the contract, or a first
aid organisation such as St John Ambulance may contract to provide
first aid coverage to a commercial event, but the staff provided will be
* Lecturer, University of York. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 2011 SLS
Conference. The author would like to thank participants for their comments. The author would
also like to thank Dr T.T. Arvind, Prof. Jenny Steele, and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain my own. Address for correspondence: York
Law School, Freboys Lane, University of York, Heslington East, York YO10 5GD. Email:
phillip.morgan@york.ac.uk.
1 European Commission-DG EAC, Volunteering in the European Union, Final Report (London
2011), 11; also EYV 2011: Focus EU, Figures on Volunteering in the EU, (http://europa.eu/
press_room/pdf/eyv2011_figures_en.pdf), (last accessed 21 February 2012).
2 According to the Department for Communities and Local Government’s 2010–11 Citizenship
Survey (London, 2011) in 2010–11, 39% of adults reported that they volunteered formally at least
once a year, and 25% reported that they volunteered formally at least once a month. 55% of adults
reported that they volunteered informally at least once a year, and 29% of adults said that they
volunteered informally at least once a month. The survey defined formal volunteering as “Giving
unpaid help through groups, clubs or organisations to benefit other people or the environment”,
and defined informal volunteering as “Giving unpaid help as an individual to people who are not
relatives”.
3 C. Rochester, A. Paine, and S. Howlett, Volunteering and Society in the 21st Century (Basingstoke
2010), 3, 222–226.
4 Cabinet Office, Building the Big Society (London 2010), para 1, 4. David Cameron, Prime
Minister’s Speech on the Big Society, 14 February 2011, (available: http://www.number10.gov.uk/
news/pms-speech-on-big-society/) (last accessed 21 February 2012).
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volunteers.5 Volunteers may work alongside paid employees, carrying
out the same tasks, receiving the same training, and wearing the same
uniform. They may be indistinguishable by members of the public, or
consumers of their services, from the paid employees that they work
alongside.
Our present approach to vicarious liability has problems in accom-
modating volunteers, and others in non-economic or non-employment
relationships. Whilst these problems presently manifest themselves in
the case law dealing with religious ministers and members of religious
communities, the problem is of a significantly broader scope.
The rhetoric urging expansion of the voluntary sector, the sector’s
take-over of public services, and its competition with commercial
concerns, should lead to a reconsideration of vicarious liability. A
volunteer can be as much a part of a team as a professional. It would
be odd if a victim, injured by a volunteer working alongside paid
employees and indistinguishable by onlookers to them, is subject to a
different legal regime, than if the victim is injured by the volunteer’s
co-worker within the organisation who happens to be a paid employee.
Further, an absence of vicarious liability for volunteers would
potentially place the individual volunteer in a detrimental position
to his employee colleague, in that vicarious liability can have the
practical effect of acting as a protective mechanism for the tortfeasor.6
We have allowed our understanding of vicarious liability to become
a polarised division between employees with contracts, and indepen-
dent contractors. This fails to give a rational account of other forms
of vicarious liability which have simply become additional pockets
of liability in addition to the “main” category. There is presently
no overarching doctrine that unites them. It is suggested that the law is
mature enough to accept vicarious liability for non-contractual em-
ployees. It is further argued that the categories of vicarious liability are
not in fact separate categories and can instead be rationalised. A new
test of association is proposed. All relationships between two persons
can be subjected to analysis along the twin axes of day to day control
and discretion in role to determine whether or not their relationship
should trigger vicarious liability. This association model accom-
modates all of the existing forms of vicarious liability and places them
into a single category. It also allows the accommodation of new and
emerging forms of economic and non-economic occupations. This will
include at least some forms of volunteers.
5 These contracts are often profit making, although most bodies within the voluntary sector will
apply this profit to funding their other, non-profit making activities.
6 See Law Reform Commission, Civil Liability of Good Samaritans and Volunteers, (LRC 93 -2009;
Dublin 2009), pp. 78 [3.88], 109 [4.12], which considers that vicarious liability may act as a form of
protection for volunteers, preventing them from being required to resort to personal resources.
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II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Vicarious liability is a system of strict liability through which one entity
A is made strictly liable for the torts of another, B, even though A is not
at fault. An action may be brought against A or B, or both. The
paradigm example of vicarious liability is that of an employer’s liability
for the torts of their employees committed within the course and scope
of their employment. This is not the only example where such liability
operates, for example, it also applies in the context of “principal” and
“agent”,7 and between partners,8 amongst others. The categories of vi-
carious liability are presently increasing. There is no overarching the-
ory which coherently explains the reason for these individual pockets of
liability.
Vicarious liability multiplies the number of possible defendants to
the claimant’s action and thus increases the probability of finding a
solvent or insured defendant.9 It is not the only way of claiming against
A. B’s tort may place A in breach of a direct duty of care to the victim
of the tort to select,10 train, and monitor B, or, A may have a non-
delegable duty to the victim, the performance of which A cannot
delegate to another,11 so that, even if A has selected, trained, and
monitored B properly, B’s tort will place A in breach of this duty. One
example of such a duty is bailment.12 These three different routes to
establishing liability on A’s behalf must be kept distinct.13 Whilst they
are not mutually exclusive, in some cases only one of the routes will
result in a successful action against a defendant. For example in cir-
cumstances where A does not owe a non-delegable duty to C, and
where A properly selects, trains, and monitors B, and is thus not in
breach of a direct duty to C, an action may only be brought against A
by invoking vicarious liability.
Accounts of the rationale behind vicarious liability differ. The
problem may be that “Vicarious liability is the creation of many judges
who have different ideas of its justification or social policy, or no idea
at all.”14 This problem is also recognised by the judiciary, MacDuff J.
recently declaring: “[t]here is no precise unanimity between judges
7 See J. Murphy, in A. Dugdale and M. Jones (eds.), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 20th ed. (London
2010), (hereafter “Clerk & Lindsell”), ·6–78, p. 397. This is not true agency, see below.
8 Partnership Act 1890, s. 10.
9 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 7th ed., (Cambridge 2006), 230. The
victim is only compensated for their injuries once.
10 E.g. Mattis v Pollock [2003] EWCA Civ 887, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2158.
11 Clerk & Lindsell, ·6–57, p. 386.
12 R. Stevens, “Non-Delegable Duties and Vicarious Liability” in J. W. Neyers, E. Chamberlain and
S. G. A. Pitel (eds.), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford 2007) (hereafter “Emerging Issues”), ch.
13, p. 337; Clerk & Lindsell, ·6–68, p. 392, based on Morris v C. W. Martin & Sons Ltd [1966]
1 Q.B. 716. See P. Morgan, “Vicarious Liability for Employee Theft: Muddling Vicarious Liability
for Conversion with Non-Delegable Duties” [2011] L.M.C.L.Q. 172.
13 W. V. H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 18th ed. (London, 2010), 945.
14 G. Williams, “Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity” (1957) 20 M.L.R. 220, 231.
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(or between academics) about the rationale; no single accepted truth.”15
The main justifications presently advanced by the judges in the case law
appear to be loss distribution,16 and enterprise liability.17 Loss distri-
bution is that “D2 [is] more able to bear the loss than D1, often (al-
though not always) because he can and will in practice insure against it.
Where there is such insurance, the cost is often in effect passed on to the
buyers or users of the service or goods provided by D2.”18 Stevens ar-
gues that this cannot be the, or indeed a, rationale for vicarious liability
since this does not explain why employers of domestic staff who are not
insured may also be vicariously liable, further that this collapses into
state liability, since this is the entity which can spread the loss most
widely.19 Relatedly, loss spreading does not explain why we have vi-
carious liability instead of other more efficient forms of loss spreading
such as taxation funded compensation or social security schemes.20
Enterprise liability justifications are based on the idea that with
benefits come burdens, he who takes the profit of the enterprise should
take the loss. However, this justification for vicarious liability as
Stevens points out fails to explain why non-profit making organisa-
tions such as the State and charities may be vicariously liable.21 Brodie
responds that “charities still run risks for the benefit of the organis-
ation”,22 and that the criticism only stands “if profit is viewed in a
purely financial sense”.23
Recognising this, Steele notes that there may be two versions of
enterprise risk, one an economic variant, and secondly a moral ver-
sion.24 To justify vicarious liability where a community interest is being
fulfilled she states that the response of the moral version is that it would
not be fair and just for an individual alone to bear the whole risk
created by satisfying the communities’ need for activities such as
policing, “[t]he costs and risks of essential public services should be
15 JGE v The English Province of Our Lady of Charity and The Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman
Catholic Diocesan Trust, [2011] EWHC 2871 (QB), [2012] 1 All E.R. 723, at [10].
16 E.g. Hughes L.J. in Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools [2010]
EWCA Civ 1106 at [35].
17 D. Brodie, “Enterprise Liability: justifying vicarious liability” (2007) 27 O.J.L.S. 493, 496 sees
Lister v Hesley Hall [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 A.C. 215 as “utterly consistent” with enterprise
liability; D. Brodie, Enterprise Liability and the Common Law (Cambridge 2010), p. 23 (hereafter
Enterprise Liability). Cf. P. Giliker, “Making the Right Connection: Vicarious liability and
institutional responsibility” [2009] T.L.J. 76.
18 Hughes L.J. in Various Claimants at [35].
19 R Stevens, Torts and Rights, (Oxford 2007), (hereafter “Torts and Rights”), p. 258. Stevens does
not consider that it is a rationale either, since one cannot add up different policy explanations
which do not fully justify the doctrine to justify the doctrine, (p. 259).
20 Note discussion in P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, A Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge
2010), 237 (hereafter “Vicarious Liability in Tort”).
21 For a convincing rebuttal of enterprise liability in its economic variant see R. Stevens, Torts and
Rights, pp. 258–259.
22 D. Brodie, Enterprise Liability, p. 11.
23 Ibid.
24 J. Steele, Tort Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, 2nd ed., (Oxford 2010), 574.
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spread around.”25 This however, is a disguised loss spreading model to
which Stevens’ criticisms stand. A counterargument to this is that it is
not just a loss spreading model, but instead it is an attempt to explain
why the loss should be spread. It is a justification for state liability,
rather than an exercise that collapses into state liability. If so, the ex-
planation fails to explain at what point loss spreading should cease. In
the case of policing it fails to explain why the loss spreading should stop
with the Chief Constable or Police Authority for the Area, and not the
nation, which can of course spread the loss most widely.
This argument may be seen to conflate two notions of loss spread-
ing, loss spreading as a social outcome, and loss spreading as a legal
outcome. It is however, submitted that the distinction between the two
is artificial. Loss spreading as a social outcome is where the loss is
passed on as a matter of fact to another, for example where a supplier
passes on the costs of vicarious liability by requiring its clients to pay
increased prices for its products. In such a case the victim of the tort
cannot directly sue those who ultimately bear the financial conse-
quences. Loss spreading as a legal outcome is where the loss is spread
by making another directly liable in law to the victim for the loss, for
example through vicarious liability, or direct actions against insurers.26
The victim may sue these others directly. There are two flaws to this
approach. Loss spreading justifications for vicarious liability do not
rely on loss spreading as a legal outcome, this is since vicarious liability
only increases the number of defendants who sustain the loss by one, or
by a small number in the case of dual vicarious liability. Loss spreading
as a legal outcome thus produces little loss spreading. Instead loss
spreading arguments look at the ability of these others to spread loss,
as a matter of fact.27 Secondly, this distinction in the context of the loss
spreading justification for vicarious liability is somewhat artificial,
since there are cases in which another can be made liable in law for the
loss, although the victim cannot sue these individuals directly. An en-
tity may compel another by force of law to pay for the consequences of
vicarious liability, even if that other is not technically made vicariously
liable. For example, with the Chief Constable, the vicarious liability
stops with the Chief Constable, and not the society which the Police
Force serves, however the Police Authority may place a precept on the
council tax, effectively compelling local council tax payers to pay
for the cost of the vicarious liability, with criminal sanctions for non-
payment. Either form of loss spreading social or legal, still does not
25 Ibid., p. 574.
26 E.g. through the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010.
27 For example through passing costs through “liability insurance and higher prices”, L. Klar, in
C. Sappideen and P. Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts, 10th ed., (Sydney 2011), 438, [·9.10].
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explain why as a matter of law the vicarious liability buck stops with
the Chief Constable.
Further as Steele notes28 enterprise liability fails to explain and dis-
tinguish between employees and independent contractors,29 unless in
such cases the contractor can be considered to be in an enterprise of
their own, something doubtful in many cases.
Of course, there may be more than one explanation for vicarious
liability,30 however, care should be taken not to use this an excuse
to incorporate flawed explanations, as Stevens pithily puts it:
“Justifications for legal rules are not like the ingredients of vegetable
soup. We cannot simply add together a number of disparate ingredients
and expect to get a satisfactory result.”31
Stevens instead relies on the idea of attribution, and uses a football
analogy: whose team does D1 play for?32 However, this is not just a
question of who is a player since whilst players may score goals, the
club manager, or physiotherapist could trigger penalties within the
league if they invade the pitch and assault the referee. To extend
the football analogy, with attribution, if a goal is scored, it matters not
if it is scored by professional footballer, or his amateur teammate who
wears the same strip and plays for the same team.
This concept of attribution is closely linked with two further justi-
fications for vicarious liability given by Atiyah, that of control33 and
group identification.34 Whilst control has been criticised as a theory for
vicarious liability, it is submitted below that these criticisms are not
well founded. It further plays a significant part in the case law in de-
termining who is an employee for the purpose of vicarious liability.
Control has two aspects, and the flaw in some of the criticisms of
control based explanations is to focus only on one dimension.35 This
will be developed in the final section of the article.
An employer is not liable for all of the torts committed by its em-
ployees. Rather the employer is only liable for those employee torts
which are committed within the course and scope of the employee’s
employment.36 There are differences in approaches within the case law
28 J. Steele, Tort Law, pp. 574–575.
29 See also D. Brodie, Enterprise Liability, pp. 507–8; further R. Stevens, in Emerging Issues, p. 361.
30 Fleming’s The Law of Torts, p. 438, [·9.10].
31 R. Stevens, Torts and Rights, p. 259. Stevens also notes that some of the traditional justifications
thrown into the mix are contradictory, and “point in different directions” (p. 259).
32 The conclusion of this article does require the discussion or adoption of Stevens’ approach to the
master’s tort theory.
33 P. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London 1967), pp. 15–16.
34 Ibid., p. 16, although refers to “identification” rather than group identification, G. Williams,
“Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity” (1957) 20 M.L.R. 231, 234, refers to “group
unity”.
35 Note R. Stevens, Torts and Rights, p. 258, criticising a control based approach on the fact that
parents are not vicariously liable for their children. Note that parental liability for children is
however a common European rule, see P. Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, pp. 196–226.
36 Clerk and Lindsell, ·6–28, p. 369.
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as to the applicable test and factors to apply to determine what is
within the course and scope of employment. The starting point is now
the speech of Lord Steyn in Lister v Hesley Hall,37 as developed by Lord
Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam and Others38 as: “the
wrongful conduct must be so closely connected with acts the … em-
ployee was authorised to do that, for the purpose of the liability of
the … employer to third parties, the wrongful conduct may fairly and
properly be regarded as done … while acting in the ordinary course
of … the employee’s employment”.39 Whilst the exact nature and scope
of the mainstream “close connection” test that determines for which of
B’s acts, the principal A, is liable for, is uncertain, it is clear that the
employers of a Warden of a school boarding house employed to look
after children in a residential setting are vicariously liable for his de-
liberate acts of abuse.40
In the case ofMaga v The Trustees of the Birmingham Archdiocese of
the Roman Catholic Church,41 vicarious liability was found for the acts
of abuse committed by a Roman Catholic Priest against a child who
lived within the parish, but who was, and whose family were uncon-
nected with the Church. The Priest was treated as an employee for
the purpose of the appeal.42 Partly based on the Supreme Court
of Canada’s reasoning in Bazley v Curry,43 Maga introduced a status
based risk test.44 Maga does not answer the question of for whom may
you be vicariously liable, but instead it answers the different question
of which acts committed by a person whom you may be vicariously
liable for, trigger vicariously liability.
The core of Maga is that where you elevate the status of another
such that it materially increases the risk of the commission of a tort,
you are vicariously liable for that tort, at least where the person whose
status is elevated is your employee.45 The author has criticised this case
elsewhere on a number of grounds.46 These criticisms also stand for the
subsequent decision of the High Court in JGE v The English Province of
Our Lady of Charity and The Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman
37 [2001] UKHL 22, [2002] 1 A.C. 215. As Giliker notes four different tests for close connection were
given in Lister, P. Giliker, “Making the right connection: Vicarious liability and institutional
responsibility” [2009] T.L.J. 35, 39, fn 30. See also P. Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort,
pp. 166–167.
38 [2002] UKHL 48, [2003] 2 A.C. 366.
39 Para. [23].
40 As in Lister itself.
41 [2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1441.
42 The issue of whether a Bishop can be vicariously liable for a Diocesan Priest was subsequently
determined in the case of JGE v The Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust
[2012] EWCA Civ 938.
43 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534.
44 P. Morgan, “Distorting Vicarious Liability” (2011) 74 M.L.R. 932.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., pp. 940–944.
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Catholic Diocesan Trust,47 in so far as it relied onMaga and attempts to
use status elevation as a mechanism in determining the question, for
whom a principal may be vicariously liable.
III. CONTRACT?
It is seen as a basic principle of vicarious liability that whilst one may be
vicariously liable for an employee’s wrong, one is not vicariously liable
for the wrongs of an independent contractor.48 In determining whether
a person is an employee or an independent contractor it is necessary
to examine whether or not these agreements amount to a contract of
service (employee), or a contract for services (independent contractor).
It is however submitted that there is in fact no need for a contract
between A and B, for A to be vicariously liable for B’s torts. The
present mainstream justification for the requirement for a contract
between A and B is based on a subrogation model of vicarious liability,
which as set out and dealt with below is incorrect. Nevertheless
given the control and attribution approach adopted, the relationship
between A and B is important in its effect on A’s relationship with the
victim C. With a control based model of vicarious liability it is possible
to argue that a contract between A and B is required to provide the
necessary vinculum iuris for control to be present. This too is a flawed
argument, a contract is just one of many ways in which A can exercise
control over B, other methods of control exist, for example public or
regulatory law, tortious duties, criminal law, and factual control. You
do not necessarily need a contract with another for them to “play for
your team.” A serviceman does not have a contract with the Crown, yet
he may be criminally liable for a failure to obey a lawful order.
There are a number of tests for determining employment for the
purposes of vicarious liability. As the Editors of Clerk and Lindsell49
state there is no one simple test and the modern approach rests on
“multiple factor[s]”. Many of the tests used come from other areas of
law. These areas have different policies to vicarious liability, for ex-
ample the policy of who is an employee for the purposes of National
Insurance is different to the policy of who is an employee for the
purposes of health and safety regulation, which in turn has a different
policy to vicarious liability.50 With the un-codified area of vicarious
47 [2011] EWHC 2871 (QB), [2012] 1 All E.R. 723. These criticisms appear to have been accepted by
the Court of Appeal, [2012] EWCA Civ 938, at [120]–[121], per Davis L.J.
48 D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners [1989] A.C. 177, 208. C.f. Winfield and Jolowicz on
Tort, pp. 948–9, suggesting that this distinction may need to be adjusted given changes in
employment practices.
49 Clerk and Lindsell, ·6–11, pp. 360–1.
50 For support for this proposition see S. Deakin, A. Johnston, and B. Markesinis, Markesinis
and Deakin’s Tort Law, 6th ed., (Oxford 2008), 698, (hereafter “Markesinis and Deakin”).
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liability, whilst employees almost invariably have such contracts of
service it is argued that they are not essential.
Neyers advances the view that vicarious liability is explicable only
as a matter of contract.51 His theory focuses on the employee-employer
relationship, rather than the employee-victim, or employer-victim re-
lationships.52 He alleges that vicarious liability results from the “em-
ployer’s implied promise in the contract of employment to indemnify
the employee for harms (including legal liability) suffered by the em-
ployee in the conduct of the employer’s business”.53 The tort victim is
then “subrogated to the employee’s right of indemnity”.54 This theory
he alleges “explains why the tortfeaser must be an employee – since if
the tortfeaser is not an employee he or she will not have a right of
indemnity from the person sought to be made vicariously liable”.55
Such an approach requires there to be a contractual relationship
between the employer and employee. With no contractual relationship
there can be no vicarious liability. Supporting this proposition is the
fact that it was considered necessary to introduce statutory vicarious
liability56 for police officers, who do not hold ordinary contracts of
employment. Neyers’ theory however is contradictory to the general
thrust of allowing vicarious liability for deliberate torts, including those
which are also criminal acts, such as the sexual abuse in Lister. No
employer would agree to indemnify an employee for such acts of abuse,
and there would be public policy reasons to prevent any such agree-
ment to do so from being enforceable. Whilst Neyers accepts that de-
liberate torts are a problem with his theory he alleges that all such cases
must be instances of personal fault or wrongly decided.57
A second criticism of this theory is that vicarious liability is not just
restricted to the employer – employee relationship, and further that
there are also a number of categories of case in which an employer is
vicariously liable for a person who does work for him in a manner
similar to an employee but with whom he has not contracted. An ex-
ample of such is the case of Hawley v Luminar Leisure Ltd.58 Here the
door attendants did not contract with Luminar, rather they contracted
with ASE Security Services Ltd, however, they were employees
of Luminar for the purposes of vicarious liability since they were
Note also R. Kidner, “Vicarious liability: for whom should the ‘employer’ be liable?” (1995) 15
Legal Studies 47.
51 J. W. Neyers, “A Theory of Vicarious Liability” (2005–2006) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 287.
52 Ibid., p. 301.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 303.
55 Ibid., p. 304.
56 Police Act 1996, s. 88.
57 Neyers, op. cit., p. 314. The theory also does not explain the requirement of the employee to
indemnify the employer, although it is submitted that the current case law on employee
indemnification is incorrect.
58 [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] I.R.L.R. 817.
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controlled by Luminar’s management and integrated into its business.
A second example is the case of Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal
Transfer (Northern) Ltd59 which introduced dual-vicarious liability
which rendered two entities vicariously liable for an employee even
though one had not contracted with him. A further example is the case
of JGE v The English Province of Our Lady of Charity and The Trustees
of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust where it was held
that a Bishop may be vicariously liable for the actions of a Diocesan
Priest, even where their relationship was not governed by contract, but
was instead governed by Roman Catholic Canon Law.60
If vicarious liability were to require a contract it would also prevent
it arising for volunteers. An individual may volunteer for a charitable
entity such as Oxfam or St John Ambulance, wear their uniform, re-
ceive their training, work for them under their direction and control,
and be a part of the public face of that organisation, yet have no con-
tract of employment with that entity. It would be odd if the entity could
then disclaim vicarious liability for them on that basis. Members of
the Armed Forces too, do not hold contracts of employment with the
Crown,61 instead they serve under terms of service. Nevertheless the
Ministry of Defence is regularly held liable for the torts of members of
the Armed Forces.62 The test for employment is thus more multifaceted
in vicarious liability, and there should be no requirement for a contract.
The significance of non-contractual employees and volunteers is
that there is no contract in which a term of indemnification can be
implied that the non-contractual employee or volunteer will indemnify
the employer for the losses sustained in being held vicariously liable for
their wrongs. This is, however, not a problem given that vicarious
liability applies in other contexts in which no contract exists in which
such a term can be implied, the industry practice in not enforcing such
provisions, and the fact that the “employee” indemnification approach
is itself incorrect.63
As argued above vicarious liability is not founded on contract, ra-
ther control and attribution. This means that one need not have a
contract for vicarious liability to be present, provided an individual
59 [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] Q.B. 510.
60 [2012] EWCA Civ 938. At the time of the abuse in JGE the applicable code was the 1917 Code of
Canon Law. The presently applicable code is the 1983 Code of Canon Law, which followed
(belatedly) the Second Vatican Council. To that extent, it may be open to distinguish JGE in future
cases involving relationships governed by the 1983 Code. However, any opportunities to
distinguish in this context are limited, and unlikely to succeed.
61 Quinn v Ministry of Defence [1998] P.I.Q.R. P387 (CA).
62 E.g. The Ministry of Defence v Charles Peter Timothy Radclyffe [2009] EWCA Civ 635; see also A
(A Child) v Ministry of Defence and Another [2004] EWCA Civ 641, [2005] Q.B. 183, per Lord
Phillips M.R., at [10], where military hospitals are staffed by military medical staff, or civilian staff
employed by the MoD, the MoD would be vicariously liable. Only the civilian staff would have
contracts of employment.
63 See G. Williams, “Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity” (1957) 20 M.L.R. 220.
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plays for your team. Both employees and volunteers may play for the
same team, and be indistinguishable to outsiders. Given the industry
practice in not enforcing employee indemnification where an employer
has been held vicariously liable,64 vicarious liability has developed
into a protective mechanism for employee tortfeasors. This is since
claimants bring their actions against the employer (since they are often
a richer and insured entity) instead of the employee, thus in practical
terms protecting the employee’s assets from being used to satisfy any
judgment in favour of the claimant.65 To deny this protection to a
teammate that discharges the same function, in the same way, as his
paid colleagues, on the basis that he is not paid, and does not have a
contract, seems odd. With the expansion of the voluntary sector, the
development of a volunteering industry which provides services tra-
ditionally provided by paid employees of the state or local authorities,
and the competition between the voluntary sector and commercial
concerns, to impose this litigation risk on the individual volunteer in-
stead of the volunteering organisation, the controlling enterprise, seems
to unduly penalise the volunteer over his employee counterpart. This
would also favour volunteering organisations over commercial con-
cerns when they compete for business, albeit at the expense of the un-
paid volunteer.
IV. BROADENING OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In recent years there has been significant broadening of the concept
of vicarious liability, and the categories of vicarious liability, both
extending a previous category and creating new ones. Most of these
however appear to be additional pockets of liability, and are not
rationalised together with liability for employees.
A. Agency
Vicarious liability is not limited to the case of employer and employee,
it may also apply in the context of principal and agent. In this context
the word agent may be confusing.66 This is since generally when one is
liable for one’s agent the liability is primary not vicarious.67 However,
in the context of vicarious liability agent is not used to connote agency
in the sense meant by commercial lawyers, but rather a different
64 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 7th ed, (Cambridge, 2006), 232.
65 A phenomena alluded to by the Irish Law Reform Commission, see Civil Liability of Good
Samaritans and Volunteers (LRC 93 -2009; Dublin 2009), pp. 78 [·3.88], 109 [·4.12].
66 T. Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford 2006), 106.
67 P. Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, p. 102.
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concept. Bowstead and Reynolds consider that such cases are in fact
not linked to agency.68 In Launchbury v Morgans69 Lord Wilberforce
accepted “that ‘agency’ in contexts such as these is merely a concept,
the meaning and purpose of which is to say ‘is vicariously liable,’ and
that either expression reflects a judgment of value”.70
The language of principal and agent in the context of vicarious
liability is typically found in the cases where one individual who has
lent a motor vehicle to another has been held vicariously liable for that
other’s wrong.71 In such cases one may be liable for one’s “agent” who
is not an employee. The “agent” need not have a contract with the
liable party.
Debates exist as to the nature of this liability. The Editors of Clerk
and Lindsell allege that this form of vicarious liability for an “agent” is
a sui generis form of liability,72 and for cases other than fraud the ca-
tegory “agent” in vicarious liability has no relevance.73 Giliker too ar-
gues that agency is distinct from vicarious liability,74 and is critical of a
resort to it. She acknowledges that two types of claim persist in this
area, that of fraudulent mis-statements and lending of a car.75 The
policy behind its use in a motoring context appears to be based on
reaching an insured defendant. The need for this is now significantly
less pressing given compulsory insurance and the Motor Insurance
Bureau for uninsured drivers.76
Nevertheless cases do exist outside of the motoring and fraud con-
texts in which a principal has been held vicariously liable for the tort of
their agent, even where the tort is not one of fraud, and where the agent
is not an agent in the contractual sense. An example is the case of the
League Against Cruel Sports Ltd v Scott and Others77 which held that a
master of hounds was vicariously liable for trespasses committed by
mounted hunt subscribers (followers) over whom he exercised control,
in addition to the hunt servants.78 However, a hunt master is not
vicariously liable for the hunt followers and supporters who follow
on foot, in cars, and on motorbikes, over which the master has sig-
nificantly less control. Whilst the League Against Cruel Sportsmay be a
68 P. Watts and F. Reynolds (eds.), Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 19th ed. (London 2010),
·8–187.
69 [1973] A.C. 127.
70 P. 135.
71 E.g. Ormrod v Crossville [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1120.
72 See Clerk and Lindsell, ·6–74, pp. 365–6.
73 Ibid., ·6–79, pp. 397–8.
74 P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, p. 110.
75 Ibid.
76 See Winfield and Jolowicz, p. 977.
77 [1986] Q.B. 240.
78 Per Park J.: “he can exercise considerable control over the conduct of a mounted subscriber in the
chase. I can find no reason why the master should not be held vicariously liable for trespass
committed by such a person.”
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controversial case, further examples of this concept of agency are to be
found in cases dealing with trade union officials or shop stewards,79 and
also the case of “Thelma” (Owners) v University College School80 where
School Governors were held vicariously liable for the negligent act of a
pupil who was acting as the Cox of the School VIII.81 Another such
application outside of these contexts is Moores v Bude-Stratton Town
Council.82 In this case a Councillor was abusive to a Council employee.
The Councillor was not an employee or officer of the council, nor a
person to whom any of the Council’s relevant powers had been dele-
gated. Whilst the Employment Appeal Tribunal was divided, the
majority held that the Council were vicariously liable for the
Councillor’s acts.83 In S v Walsall MBC84 which deals with foster par-
ents, the case was argued as one of principal and agent in a vicarious
liability context, and no objection was taken to this that vicarious
liability could not apply to principals and agents in the non-technical
sense, rather the question was instead whether foster parents were
agents.85
Nevertheless, it is difficult to find an overarching concept of
vicarious liability for agents, but the categories are not as closed as
Clerk and Lindsell otherwise suggest. One starts to agree with Rogers
that the operation of vicarious liability in the context of principal and
agent rests on “ad hoc judgment[s] that for one reason or another the
principal ought to pay”.86 If so, if one is to follow a traditional analysis,
care is needed so as not to remove the divide between employers and
independent contractors. Broader use of agency within a vicarious
liability context is made within other common law jurisdictions, and
79 Note dicta in Heatons Transport (St Helens) Ltd v Transport and General Workers Union [1973]
A.C. 15, 99, per Lord Wilberforce, applied in Thomas and Others v National Union of Mineworkers
(South Wales Area) and Others [1986] Ch. 20, 67, per Scott J.
80 [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 613.
81 “[T]he cox was the agent of the defendants. The eight was the property of the school governors,
and it was used by them for their purposes, that is to say for the training of boys, and also for the
purposes of being entered in races on the river in regattas or otherwise; and no doubt the objects of
that were to give an incentive to the boys to do their best at rowing and also, with a hope of
winning, to enhance the prestige of the school and perhaps induce parents to send their sons
there.” per H.H. Judge A Ralph Thomas, at 618.
82 [2001] I.C.R. 271, (EAT); Lindsay J, the President, being in the minority. Further applied in De
Clare Johnson v MYA Consulting Ltd Employment Appeal Tribunal, 31 August 2007 (Unreported),
concerning vicarious liability of a company for the acts of a non-employee in causing the
constructive dismissal of an employee. Reference also made in Cheltenham B.C. v Laird [2009]
EWHC 1253 (QB); [2009] I.R.L.R. 621.
83 The minority accepted vicarious liability for agents, but did not consider it to be present on the
facts of the case.
84 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1150.
85 In the context of the regulatory regime then in force, they were held not to be agents. The
regulatory regime applicable to foster parents has now changed significantly from that applicable
at the time of the injury in S v Walsall.
86 Winfield and Jolowicz, p. 976; P. Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, p. 116, considers it an
“Odd remnant” which “adds little to our understanding of the principles of vicarious liability”.
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this route was used to establish vicarious liability for foster carers in
New Zealand.87
Nevertheless this resort to the concept of agency is uncertain and
unpredictable. Agency seems a conclusion rather than a characteristic
which triggers vicarious liability. Whilst agency is available as a
mechanism to deal with some unusual cases it should not become the
norm. Giliker argues that vicarious liability for agents was used to
extend vicarious liability to those who work gratuitously for a defend-
ant.88 It is submitted that courts are masking their dislike of the binary
test of employee/independent contractor, which is becoming increas-
ingly unsuitable in the modern workforce,89 through recourse to this
notion of agency. There is less need to resort to agency if we acknowl-
edge that one can be a non-contractual employee (either where one has
a contract with another, one’s relationship is governed by a regulatory
regime, or one is a volunteer). The concept of non-contractual em-
ployee would also provide a neat solution to the situation where a
relationship is governed by a non-contractual religious vow governed
by Canon Law, such as the position of a member of a monastic com-
munity, where the control by the Abbot over a monk may be far greater
than any employer. But there will still be cases in which policy requires
vicarious liability to be present, even if by strict application of the
binary divide of employee/independent contractor, (even including
non-contractual employees), it should not be present, as in the case of
the League Against Cruel Sports. An account of vicarious liability is
required which will accommodate both these and the cases which we
have called non-contractual employees. Such an account is set out
below.
V. OTHER EMERGING CATEGORIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Recently, new categories of vicarious liability have been emerging,
and developing in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion. There has been no
attempt to give an account of them which also incorporates the tra-
ditional areas of vicarious liability. It is submitted that they are a
manifestation of the increasing unsuitability of a model of vicarious
liability founded on traditional notions of employment. In so far as
they show the inadequacies of the present approach to vicarious liab-
ility, and the need for the approach to match the needs of today, a
87 See S v Attorney General [2003] NZCA 149. Kirby J. (dissent) inHollis v Vabu [2001] HCA 44 also
relied on the concept of agency; criticised by L. McCarthy, “Vicarious Liability in the Agency
Context” (2004) 4(2) Q.U.T.L.J.J. 268.
88 P. Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, p. 109.
89 See for instance E. McKendrick, “Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-
examination” (1990) 53 M.L.R. 770.
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broader account of vicarious liability is required. Our account of vi-
carious liability needs to be able to accommodate these.
A. Employer+
The first new category of liability can be termed employer +, this
is where A, the employer of B may be vicariously liable for B’s tort,
and additionally, a second principal C may also be simultaneously
vicariously liable for B’s tort even though C does not have a contract
with B. In Viasystems90 work was carried out by a fitter and a fitter’s
mate, supplied to the second defendants by the third defendants on a
labour-only basis, under the supervision of a fitter working for the
second defendants. The fitter’s mate was negligent. The Court of
Appeal held that, both the second and third defendants were vicari-
ously liable for the negligent act.
May L.J. stated one should concentrate on the relevant negligent
act and whose responsibility it was to prevent it. There could be more
than one person responsible and thus may be more than one “em-
ployer”. This is a control analysis. That this is a control analysis is
reinforced by May L.J.’s use91 of the dicta of Denning L.J. in Denham v
Midland Employers’ Mutual Assurance Ltd:92 “if a temporary employer
has the right to control the manner in which a labourer does his
work, … then he should be responsible when he does it in the wrong
way as well as in the right way. The right of control carries with it the
burden of responsibility”. May L.J. also stressed that the critical re-
lationship for vicarious liability to be present is “the employers’ right
(and theoretical obligation) to control the relevant activity of the em-
ployee”.93 The language of a second employer, is a fiction, and is simply
shorthand for the position where the second entity is vicariously liable
for the individual. Rix L.J.,94 however, doubted that the doctrine of
vicarious liability should depend solely on the question of control and
suggested a broader test of “whether or not the employee in question is
so much part of the work, business or organisation of both employers
that it is just to make both employers answer”.
In Luminar Hallett L.J. noted the distinction between the two ap-
proaches and considered that the question of control is at the heart of
dual vicarious liability.95 This is further supported by Biffa Waste
Services Ltd and another v Maschinenfabrik Ernst Hese GmbH and
90 [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] Q.B. 510.
91 Para. [15].
92 [1955] 2 Q.B. 437, 444.
93 Para. [52].
94 Para. [78]–[79], at [79]: “the right of control has not retained the critical significance it once did”.
95 Para. [82], obiter since whichever of the two approaches adopted the Court was not persuaded that
on the facts of Luminar that it made any difference.
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others,96 which supports a control analysis. In Biffa supervision is
distinguished from control.97 The extra element that makes C liable is
control.
The existence of a form of liability founded on control and a fic-
tional deeming of a second employer based on their control of B would
suggest that it is not too great a leap to establish a form of vicarious
liability based on control alone. It is submitted that the law has now
established such liability. If control is sufficient to establish the ad-
ditional vicarious liability of C, it should be enough to establish vi-
carious liability even if there is no other entity to which C’s vicarious
liability may be dual or additional. Luminar as a case in which dual
vicarious liability was held not to be present supports this. The door
attendant in Luminar did not contract with Luminar, rather he con-
tracted with ASE Security Services Ltd, however, he was an employee
of Luminar for the purposes of vicarious liability since he was con-
trolled by Luminar’s management and integrated into its business.
Luminar had no contract with him. They did not pay him. Yet they
were vicariously liable for him. The employer with whom he had a
contract, and who paid him, ASE Security Services Ltd, on the other
hand, were not vicariously liable for him – they did not exercise the
requisite control. Whilst the language of transfer of employment is of-
ten used, this is a fiction, there is no transfer of contract.98 One entity is
made vicariously liable for another simply on the basis of control, and
(possibly) integration. The application of this to volunteers and vo-
lunteering organisations is obvious. It should make no difference that
there is another entity with whom that individual does have a contract
with who does not exercise any control. Luminar also shows the cen-
trality of control, an employer who pays you, and with whom you have
a contract of employment ceases to be vicariously liable for you if they
cease to have control over you.
B. Unincorporated Associations
In Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian
Schools99 the Claimants alleged abuse by staff at their former school.100
For the relevant period the School was run by a board of managers.
Some, but not all, of the School’s teachers were supplied by the
96 [2008] EWCA Civ 1257, [2009] Q.B. 725.
97 Para. [58], per Stanley Burnton L.J. “Supervision is not control. An architect or a clerk of the
works may supervise the work of a contractor’s employees, but he does not exercise control for the
purposes of vicarious liability. … But the right to supervise does not, without more, carry with it
the entitlement to instruct how to do the work, particularly where the employees are not unskilled
labourers but skilled welders.”
98 Denham v Midland Employers’ Mutual Assurance Ltd [1955] 2 Q.B. 437, 443 per Denning L.J.
99 [2010] EWCA Civ 1106. This case it is submitted casts some doubt on the status based risk
approach contained in Maga, see Op. cit. P. Morgan, “Distorting Vicarious Liability”.
100 Para. [1].
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Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools,101 an unincorporated
association. The question was whether the Institute, in addition to the
School Management, were liable for the acts of abuse committed by the
Brothers who were employed by the Managers.102 In addition, at least
one volunteer helper was alleged to have been an abuser,103 however,
the Court of Appeal did not address the issue of vicarious liability for
volunteers.
The Institute is a ‘lay community of teachers’, who swear lifelong
vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, live under a strict rule of
conduct and wear habits.104 Members are addressed as ‘Brother’. A
brother is a ‘lay’ religious and cannot be ordained as a priest, since the
“reason for his ministry is not to preside at liturgical services or to
administer the sacraments, but to educate his students as Christians in
secular subjects as well as in religion”.105 They live in communities and
evangelise through teaching. They are a ‘lay’ rather than a monastic
order since they are subject to the authority of the Diocesan Bishop.106
Whilst the issue of vicarious liability was in the context of dual
vicarious liability it did not turn on this issue and the Court of Appeal
examined the question of vicarious liability for members of unincor-
porated associations generally.
The Institute was held not to be vicariously liable for the Brothers’
acts of abuse. Hughes L.J.,107 held that vicarious liability could apply to
unincorporated associations,108 but treated the position differently to
employment, appearing to propose that the test for establishing suf-
ficient connection to the tort is different. This is an additional form of
vicarious liability, although Hughes L.J. did not consider it to be a new
one.109 Pill L.J. held that the case did not turn on the Institute’s unin-
corporated association status,110 as it is a hierarchical tight-knit organ-
isation with a mission, and thus a Court should not be deterred from
finding vicarious liability by qualms about finding members respon-
sible for the conduct of another member. He correctly noted that111 the
Institute is distinguishable from a professional or educational organ-
isation.112 Nevertheless the claim to vicarious liability failed upon an
101 The De La Salle Institute, hereafter ‘the Institute’. The brother teachers were identifiable by their
names and dress.
102 Under contracts of employment.
103 Para. [9].
104 Para. [54], [78].
105 http://www.lasalle.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=96&Itemid=55&lang=en
(last visited 21 February 2012).
106 Para. [24].
107 With whom Tomlinson L.J. agreed.
108 Para. [38].
109 Para. [40]–[41], given that partnerships are a form of unincorporated association.
110 Para. [76].
111 Para. [83].
112 Which normally decides what standard a person has to attain before a qualification is conferred,
Para. [84].
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analysis of the responsibility for managing the School.113 The School
was run by a Board of Managers, not the Institute. The Institute had
not undertaken the role of managing the School,114 and did not manage
the School.115 The Institute did not exercise effective control over a
Brother’s conduct of his teaching job,116 instead a Brother’s teaching
was subject to the control of the Board of Managers.117 It was the Board
of Managers, the employers of the Brother Teachers, who managed the
School, who were vicariously liable for them.118
In examining the connection of the tort to the relationship, Hughes
L.J., noted that the position of an agent119 is not the same as an em-
ployee,120 and that the relationships should be treated differently: “They
are clearly not all treated the same. They do not all create the same
connection between the tort of D1 and his relationship with D2”.121 He
evoked the close connection test in Lister, nevertheless he did not reach
the outcome which an application of the Lister close connection test
would reach in the circumstances. This was recognised by Pill L.J., who
considered that if vicarious liability were to be established, applying
Lister it would extend to the alleged acts of abuse.122 Instead Hughes
L.J., with whom Tomlinson L.J. agreed,123 as shown by his conclusion
that there was no close connection, used a narrower test, although he
did not fully elucidate it. He considered that “the risk must be inherent
in a business or operation carried on by D2, entrusted by him to D1”.124
He considered there was no entrustment to the Brother Teachers by the
other members of the Institute, and even if there was they did not have
the “required interest” to “create the necessary close connection”.125
Whilst the case was decided in the context of institutional abuse,
vicarious liability within unincorporated associations obviously ex-
tends beyond this area. It is the category of vicarious liability that you
would wish to examine if during a village cricket match a club member
of a visiting team negligently hits a six into a playground and injures a
child. This form of vicarious liability seems to be founded on control
113 Oddly Maga was not referred to in this case. This does not however make the case per incuriam
since the facts are sufficiently different for the two to be distinguished, further in so far as Various
Claimants deals with the required connection of the relationship to the tort, it deals with a different
relationship and it is submitted that it is possible to discern from the case that different tests of
connection to the tort may be applicable to different relationships (for example unincorporated
associations).
114 Para. [87].
115 Para. [53].
116 Para. [48], [56].
117 Para. [53].
118 Para. [85].
119 Used here in a broad sense.
120 Para. [42].
121 Para. [42].
122 Para. [85].
123 Para. [65].
124 Para. [47].
125 Para. [57].
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and interest in the activity,126 which in turn relates to the issue of attri-
bution. The test for sufficient connection, whilst only loosely eluci-
dated, would appear to be different from the close connection test
adopted within the employer/employee context.
The recognition of vicarious liability in the context of unincorpor-
ated associations is significant. Within English law the notion of an
unincorporated association is very broad. Unincorporated associations
do not have legal personality.127 They may encompass large complex
and disciplined organisations, such as the Institute, to informal and
temporary groups that have come “together for temporary and specific
purposes with little or nothing by way of formally-agreed rules”.128
According to Hughes L.J. in R v L129: “the legal description “unincor-
porated association” applies equally to any collection of individuals
linked by agreement into a group. Some may be solid and permanent;
others may be fleeting, and/or without assets. A village football team,
with no constitution and a casual fluctuating membership, meeting on
a Saturday morning on a rented pitch, is an unincorporated associ-
ation”.
Lawton L.J. in Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell130
stated that an unincorporated association is “two or more persons
bound together for one or more common purposes, not being business
purposes, by mutual undertakings, each having mutual duties and ob-
ligations, in an organisation which has rules which identify in whom
control of it and its funds rests and upon what terms and which can be
joined or left at will”. For there to be an unincorporated association
there is a need for a contract between each and every member.131
However, such contracts are easily found, and if an “implicit but suf-
ficiently clear understanding is reached by two or more people, there is
a contract forming an unincorporated association”.132
Various Claimants turned on issue of control, who had power to
control the Brothers in their teaching role, whilst the Institute no doubt
had significant control over the Brothers’ day to day lives and conduct,
it did not control the Brothers in their teaching role, instead, the Board
of Managers did. It would appear that both the employer+category of
vicarious liability, and the category present in Various Claimants can
126 An approach to vicarious liability based on an economic view of enterprise liability cannot
account for liability in such a context given the charitable activities of the Institute, nor would it
account for imposing vicarious liability on range of unincorporated associations.
127 Scottish Law Commission, Unincorporated Associations, Scot Law Com No 217, (Edinburgh
2009), pp. 2 [1.4], 7 [2.2]; N. Stewart, N. Campbell, and S. Baughan, The Law of Unincorporated
Associations (Oxford 2011), p. 4 [·1.09].
128 Stewart et al., p. 7 [·2.1].
129 [2008] EWCA Crim 1970, [2009] P.T.S.R. 119, at [11].
130 [1982] 1 W.L.R. 522, 525.
131 Ibid.
132 Stewart et al., p. 12 [·2.01].
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collapse into a single category based on control and interest in the
activity, this leading to attribution, whose team are they playing for?
Whilst the requirement for a contract for there to be an unincor-
porated association would suggest that the category of vicarious liab-
ility for unincorporated associations cannot be joined with the
employer+category, this is to fall into a trap. Although such contracts
are readily found, for vicarious liability to be present what is required
by Various Claimants is control and interest, membership alone is not
enough. With the unincorporated association category the control is
provided by, and the interest demonstrated via, the contract, however,
in vicarious liability control may be present via other means such as
criminal law, public or regulatory law, tortious duties and factual
control. The unincorporated association category is simply an illus-
tration of that concept. That such categories can collapse into a single
category is supported by the Luminar decision.
C. Elevation of Status?
The core ofMaga133 is that where you elevate the status of another such
that it materially increases the risk of the commission of a tort, you are
vicariously liable for that tort, at least where the person whose status is
elevated is your employee.134 Is there also a category of vicarious liab-
ility whereby A who confers office upon B, or elevates135 a particular
individual B to a position of authority and grants them status over
another (C), may be vicariously liable for B’s torts by mere fact of the
conferral of or elevation of status alone, even when B is not treated as
A’s employee? Such a category would have obvious application in the
case of foster carers, or religious ministers. This idea of status is
broader than the conferral of powers of control over the victim, for
example a religious minister, such as the priest in Maga may occupy a
position of authority and has status conferred upon him through or-
dination, but that minister will not necessarily have any power of
control, even over his own congregation, or those unconnected with his
religion or religious denomination.
Leaving aside the criticisms made of a status elevation approach by
the author in an earlier piece,136 status elevation or status conferral by
themselves cannot be enough to trigger potential vicarious liability.
More must be required. A change in status may enhance the risk of the
commission of a tort, and therefore play a role, but risk enhancement
by itself is also not a justification for vicarious liability. Even if status
133 [2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1441.
134 Ibid.
135 The word elevate is used to connote an increase in “status”.
136 P. Morgan, “Distorting Vicarious Liability”.
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elevation has been used within existing categories of vicarious liability
in establishing close connection, it cannot establish new categories of
vicarious liability by itself. This is so even if the elevation is to a high
status, such as that of a Peer; in such a case the Crown cannot be
vicariously liable for the acts of the newly ennobled who utilise their
newfound status to defraud others. A response to this is that ennoble-
ment confers status, but not authority, over others, and it is the status
derived authority that is the core of the elevating status approach. For
example, a University may confer degree awarding powers on a private
college, this confers a status on that college which it did not previously
have. However, it does not grant authority to the college over the stu-
dents of that college. Any authority the private college has over its
students stems from its contractual arrangements with those students.
Although the conferral of status may have facilitated that authority in
that the students may not have contracted with the private college if it
did not have degree awarding powers, the authority is not directly de-
rived from that status. This objection is still unsound, with the case of
adoption, where a person is elevated to the ultimate position of auth-
ority over another, that of parent to a child, the state cannot be subject
to vicarious liability for the acts of the adoptive parent post adoption
despite the state’s role in the adoption process. Simply placing B in a
position where they may have authority or control over another is not
enough, there should be no vicarious liability without control or attri-
bution (of or over B) being present.
Whilst the point of whether or not there could be vicarious liability
for a Priest was not taken inMaga, it was in JGE and in the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Doe v Bennett.137 With a religious
minister such as the Priest in Maga or JGE, control and attribution
may be present. It is these, rather than the status alone which mean that
the Roman Catholic Church should be vicariously liable for a Priest’s
torts provided there is a sufficient connecting factor to the tort. The
decision of the High Court in JGE to the extent that it can be inter-
preted to suggest otherwise is incorrect. Reliance on status based risk
enhancement/creation to establish a category of vicarious liability is
unwelcome.138
137 2004 SCC 17, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 436.
138 See P. Morgan, “Distorting Vicarious Liability”. Although referring to the issue of status in
establishing close connection to the tort, the arguments are equally valid in this context. In relying
upon status elevation the High Court in JGE cited South African authority (Police v Rabie (1986) 1
S.A. 117) which sits oddly alongside co-ordinate English case law (P. Morgan, “Distorting
Vicarious Liability”, p. 943). The reliance on status in JGE by the High Court may be a by-product
of the misleading approach taken in the case to the level of control exercisable by a Bishop over a
Priest of his Diocese (see below). These criticisms appear to have been accepted by Davis L.J. in
JGE, at [120]–[121], who cited the author’s previous work (at [117]).
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D. Close Connection
Recently an alternative category of vicarious liability has been sug-
gested based on close connection. If there is a sufficiently close con-
nection between A and B, A may be vicariously liable for B. This is a
relationship close connection test. Confusingly the same language is
used in this relationship close connection test as the close connection
test which is used to determine whether or not the tort was sufficiently
connected to the relationship.
The relationship close connection test stems from the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in Doe v Bennett. This case concerned the
question of whether or not a Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation
could be vicariously liable for the torts of a Roman Catholic Priest of
the Diocese. The significance of this case is not the fact that it addresses
the question of vicarious liability for a religious minister, but rather
that it successfully invoked vicarious liability for a non-employee. In
doing so Doe proposed a test of broad application to distinguish be-
tween those for whom vicarious liability should be present, and those
for whom it should not.
Whether or not Roman Catholic Priests are employees does not
affect the potential value of the close connection approach proposed
in these cases, given that these tests will be applicable to those who
are clearly not employees, such as unpaid volunteers, or those to whom
other categories of vicarious liability have been applied so far. Whilst
recent case law on the employment status of religious ministers
has accepted employee status for certain purposes,139 these cases deal
with other denominations with very different systems of regulation and
canon law to the Roman Catholic Church, and the Court of Appeal in
JGE held that Roman Catholic Priests were not employees.140
In Doe, McLachlin C.J., giving the judgment of the court, con-
sidered that there were two elements to vicarious liability, “[f]irst, the
relationship between the tortfeasor and the person against whom
liability is sought must be sufficiently close. Second, the wrongful act
must be sufficiently connected to the conduct authorized by the em-
ployer.”141 This is a model of vicarious liability based not on employ-
ment, but instead predicated on the proximity of the relationship
139 Moore v President of the Methodist Conference [2011] EWCA Civ 1581, Methodist Minister was an
employee for the purposes of Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. New Testament
Church of God v Stewart [2007] EWCA Civ 1004, [2008] I.C.R. 282, New Testament Church of
God Pastor was an employee for the purposes of Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland [2005] UKHL 73, [2006] 2 A.C. 28,
Ordained Minister of the Church of Scotland working as an Associate Minister was an employee
for the purposes of Section 82(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
140 The Court of Appeal in JGE held that they were not employees, at [30] per Ward L.J., at [131],
per Davis L.J.
141 Para. [20].
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between two parties. Its applicability to volunteers is clear. For the
Supreme Court of Canada the determination of the sufficiency of
closeness of the relationship, is strongly influence by control: “[a]t the
heart of the inquiry lies the question of power and control by the em-
ployer”.142 The Supreme Court of Canada held that the relationship
between priest and bishop was sufficiently close for vicarious liability to
be present, since a bishop exercises significant control over a priest.143
Whilst the invocation of control in Doe is theoretically sound, the flaw
inDoe it that it is a model based on a single dimensional idea of control,
that is too simplistic and would lead to odd conclusions (see below).
This use of the language of close connection to establish whether or
not a relationship between parties is sufficient for it to trigger vicarious
liability was used in an English context in the first instance decision in
JGE. JGE was the first case in which an English Court was specifically
asked the question of whether a Diocesan Bishop of the Roman
Catholic Church can be vicariously liable for the acts of a priest within
the diocese. In other English cases this point has been assumed or
conceded.144 Both the High Court and Court of Appeal concluded that
the relationship was sufficient to trigger vicarious liability, only the
High Court relied on a close connection test. An efficient shortcut to
the conclusion existed through the notion of vicarious liability within
unincorporated associations, however, this form of vicarious liability
was not discussed.145
The High Court in JGE however, despite utilising the language of
close connection, and citing McLachlin C.J.’s, two stages, ignored the
Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to control as being a key part
of the determination of close connection. The motivation behind this
appears to be the different findings of fact at first instance in JGE
compared toDoe on the evidence of canon law as to the question of the
142 Para. [21].
143 Para. [27]. “The priest takes a vow of obedience to the bishop. The bishop exercises extensive
control over the priest, including the power of assignment, the power to remove the priest from his
post and the power to discipline him.” ([27]). The relationship was therefore considered “akin to
employment” ([27]). [Editor’s note: For the official view of the Catholic Church, see Pontifical
Council for Legislative Texts, “Nota Esplicativa” (2004): http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/
pontifical_councils/intrptxt/documents/rc_pc_intrptxt_doc_20040212_vescovo-diocesano_it.html
(last visited 19 September 2012.)]
144 The litigation instead being fought on the sufficiency or not of the connection between the tort and
the relationship: Maga v The Trustees of the Birmingham Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic
Church [2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] 1 W.L.R. 1441, at [36], (Diocesan Priest/Non-Catholic
member of the local community). Whilst other cases have assumed that there may be vicarious
liability for Priests, these cases have not looked at the relationship between Bishop/Priest, but
rather in these cases the Priest was also a teacher and the principal was the Board of Governors,
e.g. C v D, SBA [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) at [111] (Priest Headmaster/Pupil, Board of Governors
“unquestionably” vicariously liable), Raggett v Society of Jesus Trust 1929 for Roman Catholic
Purposes [2010] EWCA Civ 1002; [2010] C.P. Rep. 45 (Priest Schoolteacher/Pupil).
145 However, given that the test of connection to the tort test in unincorporated association cases
would appear to be different, and more difficult to establish, it is understandable why counsel for
the claimant would not wish to frame their case around this pocket of vicarious liability.
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control that a bishop exercises over a priest. The test proposed at first
instance in JGE, whilst using the same language, is more fluid, indeed,
MacDuff J. recognised the possibility for uncertainty, admitting that
the close connection test is easier to recognise than define146 and stated
that: “[t]he court will look carefully at the full nature of the relation-
ship. All the surrounding facts and circumstances are to be considered.
These will include many of the matters which are of relevance also at
stage two”.147 Again, the significance of this case in the context of this
article, is not that it concerns priests, or its conclusion on that issue, but
rather the alternative category of vicarious liability that it proposes.
MacDuff J’s close connection test in JGEmay be seen as attempt to
introduce a new, more encompassing form of vicarious liability to
English law. Despite invoking Doe and the same language, this close
connection test, is a different test to that in Doe. Its applicability to
volunteers, however, is also clear. Whilst not expressly stated,148 that
this was intended as a new overarching category of vicarious liability,
this is clear from the conclusion that a relationship of employer/
employee would meet this first test, but other relationships would also
be sufficient, including Bishop/Priest.149 An overarching category of
vicarious liability is welcome, the current un-rationalised pockets of
liability that currently exist lead to artificialities and anomalies.
However, a shift away from control, given its centrality to vicarious
liability is unwelcome.
Unfortunately, in so far as either version of the relationship close
connection test were an attempt to create an overarching category of
vicarious liability they were both flawed. Firstly, with such an ap-
proach the same factual material may need to be examined twice, firstly
in establishing the close connection between the persons, and secondly
to establish the close connection between the tort and the relation-
ship.150 Thus in some cases if the first stage is fulfilled, the second stage
which determines the connection to the tort may be a formality, in that
the question and test will not be sufficiently different.
Secondly, whilst an attempt at rationalising vicarious liability is
welcome, close connection is not the appropriate way in which to do so.
Close connection as a test in this context (in either form) is too broad.
Simply assessing the association between two individuals would lead to
146 Para. [41].
147 Para. [41].
148 Whilst the argument in the case was centred on whether the relationship was “akin to
employment”, refreshingly MacDuff J. moved away from simply discussing whether or not a
Priest is an employee. Disappointingly, whilst MacDuff J. acknowledged that other categories of
vicarious liability may exist ([6]), he did not discuss, or engage with them, or attempt to overtly
rationalise them into a single category.
149 Para. [34], [43].
150 Particularly given the reliance on authorities on the second close connection test to inform the
relationship close connection test by MacDuff J. in JGE.
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vicarious liability of parents for the acts of their children, something
which is not accepted in English law.151 That this test is too broad is
implicitly admitted in MacDuff J.’s comments in JGE: “to assist the
performance of the role”,152 and further through his use of the language
of just and fair,153 as a control mechanism for vicarious liability which is
reminiscent of fair, just, and reasonable, the language used to control
direct duties and to determine whether or not they exist in a given
context. It is therefore with some relief that the Court of Appeal ac-
cepted the author’s criticisms of the close connection test in JGE154
(including the parent/child example)155 and refused to endorse such
a test.
Although the model of close connection in Doe is preferable to that
at first instance in JGE since it correctly incorporates the centrality of
control to vicarious liability. The flaw with either model of relationship
close connection test is that vicarious liability does not look at the
strength of association between two individuals. Instead it looks at the
strength of association between two individuals in the context of a
purposeful activity assigned by one (A) to the other (B) (or assigned by
and to one another, such as in some unincorporated associations), for
the benefit of A, or in order to achieve A’s objectives.156 This is the
reason why a parent is not vicariously liable for their child. The child
has no assigned purposeful activity, unless it is assigned a task by
another, which must be for that other’s benefit or to achieve that
other’s objectives. Of course, there will be some circumstances of par-
ental vicarious liability, where a parent has employed their own child,
but vicarious liability does not stem from the parental relationship
alone, or their status. This is further dealt with below. An alternative
rational account of vicarious liability is proposed later in this article,
with a different overarching category.
E. Akin to Employment
In holding a Bishop vicariously liable for a Priest the majority of the
Court of Appeal in JGE stepped away from the close connection test
used by the High Court and utilised a new category of vicarious liab-
ility, that of “akin to employment”. This new category does not require
151 Donaldson v McNiven [1952] 2 All E.R. 691, 692, per Lord Goddard C.J., “Some people
have thought that parents ought to be responsible for the torts of their children, but they are not.”
See P. Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, pp. 196–226 for a comparative survey of parental
liability.
152 Para. [42].
153 Para. [42].
154 P. Morgan, “Revising Vicarious Liability – A Commercial Perspective” [2012] L.M.C.L.Q. 175,
179. Cited in JGE, at [56], per Ward L.J., and [117], per Davis L.J.
155 Para. [61], per Ward L.J.
156 MacDuff J. recognises this implicitly, at Para. [35], “he was appointed in order to do their work”,
and at [36], “the man appointed and authorised by them to act on their behalf.”
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a contract of service,157 and applies to where the relationship “is so close
in character to one of employer/employee that it is just and fair to hold
the employer vicariously liable”.158
This is an incremental response, which will catch what the author
has termed non-contractual employees. Its parameters are not yet
hammered out. It may be open to criticism in that in operating this test
Ward L.J. overstressed the economic element required for vicarious
liability.159 With some volunteers there may be no remuneration or fi-
nancial benefits. The test also does not encompass some forms of vi-
carious liability based on agency and within some unincorporated
associations. However, this criticism is unfair since unlike the close
connection test this test does not attempt to encompass all forms of
vicarious liability, and is not an overarching category of vicarious
liability. There will still be cases in which policy requires vicarious
liability to be present, even if by strict application of the binary divide
of employee/independent contractor, (even including non-contractual
employees, or relationships akin to employment), it should not be
present.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Non-delegable duties are often resorted to and adopted as a response to
perceived inadequacies in vicarious liability.160 It is being increasingly
utilised to “plug the gaps left by … vicarious liability” particularly
given that formal employee-employer relationships are “dwindling”.161
Lister suggests that there may be such a duty in a child care
context.162 Such a duty would however depend on the wording of the
relevant statute or statutory instrument.163 Non-delegable duties are
easy to invent. Indeed, Glanville Williams described them as a “logical
157 Para. [73], per Ward L.J.
158 Ibid.
159 Para. [79]–[80]. Davis L.J. (the other member of the majority), ignored the financial
considerations, and looked at control, connection, and objectives.
160 See G. Williams, “Liability for Independent Contractors” (1956) C.L.J. 180; for non-delegable
duties in a child care context see P. Case, Compensating Child Abuse in England and Wales
(Cambridge 2007), 106–107.
161 J. Murphy, “Juridical Foundations of Common Law Non-Delegable Duties” in J. Neyers,
E. Chamberlain and S. G. A. Pitel, Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford 2007), ch. 14, p. 371.
162 See R. Stevens in Emerging Issues, p. 363.
163 To give an example, with foster parents the legislation governing their relationships with both
authorities and the foster children differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Such a non-delegable
duty was rejected by the Canadian Supreme Court inMB v British Columbia 2003 SCC 53, [2003] 2
S.C.R. 477 and KLB v British Columbia, 2003 SCC 51, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403, whilst non-delegable
duties were present in the relevant legislation the Court stated there was no general non-delegable
duty to ensure that no harm comes to children through the abuse or negligence of foster parents. A
non-delegable duty approach is taken in Louisiana, Vonner v State of Louisiana, 273 So.2d 252,
LA 1973, and Miller v Martin, Department of Social Services, State of Louisiana and Methodist
Home for Children, 838 So.2d 761, LA 2003. A non-delegable duty was also adopted in Bartels v
The County of Westchester, 76 A.D.2d 517, NY 1980.
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fraud”.164 One cannot simply manufacture non-delegable duties for
cases where liability for volunteers or other non-employees is desired,
this would make liability for volunteers or non-employees more
onerous than for employees, in that with non-delegable duties there is
no need for a close connection to the tort for liability to be triggered.
Direct duties too are not the solution. To take an example, St John
Ambulance may select a volunteer, train them, and assess them to en-
sure that they meet industry standards. That individual might also be a
professional health care worker in their non-voluntary employment.
Whilst the organisation owes a duty of care to the victim to properly
select, train, and monitor the volunteer, to breach this duty fault is
required. Where proper selection, training, and monitoring has oc-
curred, if such a volunteer whilst on duty with St John Ambulance then
attempts to use Reiki to deal with a heart attack, this causing harm,
there will be no direct claim on St John Ambulance since it is not in
breach of a direct duty to the heart attack victim as it is not at fault.
If however an NHS ambulance paramedic responded to the incident,
the NHS likewise owes a duty of care to the victim to properly select,
train, and monitor its paramedics. Where the NHS has carried out
proper selection, training, and monitoring, but the paramedic at-
tempted to treat in the same negligent way, causing harm, there would
also be no direct action against the health authority, since it is not at
fault. However, in the latter case vicarious liability would be present as
the paramedic is an employee. Likewise if St John Ambulance were
utilising an employed staff member, instead of a volunteer, there would
be vicarious liability.
VII. A RATIONAL ACCOUNT?
In examining the question of whether vicarious liability is present for
a volunteer or for a non-employee there is presently a need to examine
a number of different categories of vicarious liability, some of which
overlap. The present system produces presently unlinked pockets of
vicarious liability, in doing so it accepts vicarious liability for some
individuals who do not have contracts of employment such as members
of the Armed Forces and some office holders. Nevertheless, it fails to
account for volunteers, of which there are many types from employees
in all but name on the one hand, to occasional Church flower arrangers
on the other.
The problem is that vicarious liability is not properly rationalised.
Rather than accept that pockets of liability exist outside of the normal
contractual employee -employer category which may render a principal
164 G. Williams, “Liability for Independent Contractors” (1956) C.L.J. 180, 193. Cf. R. Stevens,
Emerging Issues, p. 368: “Non-delegable duties are not the cuckoos in the nest.”
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vicariously liable for another who they would not be liable for under
the traditional divide, there has been a tendency to ignore them, or to
declare them anomalous, whereas they are a natural release of steam
caused by the inadequacies of the present approach to who is an
employee for the purposes of vicarious liability. We tend to think of
employer and employee, and employer and independent contractors as
a binary divide. We forget that these divides are largely labels which we
use to describe the outcome, of vicarious liability, or no vicarious
liability. There are of course a range of relationships which are anal-
ogous to, but are not quite, employment, just as there are ranges in
types of employment.
A better approach, linked to the idea of control and attribution is to
think of vicarious liability as being a two axes scale, which assesses
association. The position of a person on this scale indicates whether or
not they are part of the principal’s team so as to trigger vicarious
liability for them. This approach does not require there to be any
contract, and volunteers can be plotted onto the scale. A volunteer can
be as much part of the team as a professional.
Along the X axis is day to day control. This aspect of control covers
all day to day aspects of a person’s role excluding the method of
working. This axis ranges from the lowest level of control to the high-
est. Factors to determine the level of day to day control would cover, a
range of matters including for example dictation of working hours and
location, dress codes and uniforms, disciplinary systems, and whether
or not they may have a lunch break, amongst many others. This ranges
from a level of control from a highly regimented system where day to
day control exists over persons even when they are off duty and where
criminal penalties may be imposed for a failure to follow lawful orders
(such as in the Armed Forces) or to act (such as within the Police
Service), to a level of day to day control where the only control the
principal has over the person is the power to exclude them from their
premises, for instance a volunteer who cleans the Church hall after
hours. This need not be control in law though, but rather control in
fact, since in a highly regimented religious community such as a mon-
astery there may be no “legal” control by the leader of a religious
community such as an Abbot over the individual monk since English
law may not recognise the canon law under which the monk made his
vow of obedience, whereas in fact the Abbot’s control over the monk
would typically exceed most employers’ control over their employees.
With what we currently label independent contractors the principal is
likely to have significantly less day to day control than over what we
currently label employees, this will however, not always be the case.
The second axis is labelled discretion in role. This covers how
the person carries out the role, and the level of direction they receive.
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At one end of the scale the individual has little discretion in how to
carry out the role, they must follow the direction and instructions of
their principal as to the exact process they must use. At the other
end of the scale is complete discretion, provided the person achieves
the required end result it matters not which method they used to get
there. This is a better approach than simply examining whether some-
one is an employee or independent contractor. The volunteer cleaner
of the Church hall may be able to clean it using whatever method
and equipment they like, however, an unpaid volunteer for St John
Ambulance must follow certain processes, and may not for instance use
Reiki to treat a suspected heart attack.
Using these two axes a person can be plotted on to the chart. Their
position on the chart determines whether or not the principal is vi-
cariously liable for them, whether or not they play for the principal’s
team, or are one of the support staff sufficiently connected to trigger
vicarious liability. This method therefore includes those who do not
have contracts of employment such as members of the Armed Forces,
office holders, religious ministers and members of religious communi-
ties, volunteers, agents, hunt followers, and requires no stretching or
the development of new categories. This approach would explain for
instance why mounted subscribers for a hunt trigger vicarious liability
on the part of the master of a hunt, but not the followers in cars.
What the diagram demonstrates is that for vicarious liability to be
present, as the level of discretion in role increases, more day to day
control is required to compensate for this higher level of discretion. For
vicarious liability to be present where the level of discretion in role is at
its highest, day to day control must be at an extremely high level.
Such an approach will make little difference for many of those over
which vicarious liability is presently acknowledged to exist in so far as
those currently considered employees are concerned, or those currently
considered independent contractors, however, it will make a difference
for some. This use of a two axes approach to the elements of control
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also ensures that vicarious liability does not result for parents for
their children, since one axis is discretion in the role.165 The singular
approach to what are presently seen as different forms of vicarious
liability does appear to indicate that the same test of connection of the
person’s role to the tort is used for all cases, however, this need not be
the case and the close connection test, which assesses the links between
the relationship and the tort, can operate more strongly or weakly de-
pending on where the relationship falls on the chart.166
Of course, there will be some circumstances of parental vicarious
liability, but in these cases vicarious liability does not stem from the
parental relationship alone, or their status. An example of where such
vicarious liability is present is where a child is employed in the parents’
family business. For the vicarious liability axis test to be triggered, a
parent must assign the child an activity that has a purpose beneficial
to the parent or which achieves the parent’s objectives; the parent’s
objectives for the child (the actor), are not enough. Thus ordering the
child to do its homework is not enough. Once such an assignment of a
role has taken place, just like any relationship where someone is car-
rying out a role for another it becomes subject to the two axis test.
Thus where a child carries out work for the family business, there
will be vicarious liability in some cases, but not in others which are
more in the nature of what is currently termed an independent con-
tractor relationship.
An example of where there would be no vicarious liability in most
cases is where a parent orders their child to wash the parent’s car. Just
as if they get anyone else to wash their car for them, such as a scout
carrying out work for “bob-a-job” week, the relationship becomes
subject to the axis test. However, in both cases there would be no
vicarious liability (the relationship is more in the nature of an inde-
pendent contractor), they are not playing for the parent’s team, and
their discretion in role is high, even if the parent provides the relevant
equipment. Supervision, as noted in Biffa, is not control. There is
however a difference between the unrelated scout and the parent’s
child, in the context of the level of day to day control. However,
vicarious liability is not present apart from the most extreme cases of
when the parent directs exactly how the child is to carry out the job for
them, so as to remove most of their discretion, and disciplines the child
when they deviate from this; however, vicarious liability would be
165 With the ordinary activities of a child, such as play, its level of discretion and the fact that it cannot
be said to have a role vis-a`-vis the parents means that vicarious liability is not present. If however
the child is carrying out a task or work for its parents this is a different issue, and the discretion in
the assigned role will need to be analysed.
166 As with the current separate categories where a different test was used in Various Claimants.
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present for anyone working under such a strict regime, whether they
were the parent’s child or not.
Control analysis is often discredited using the example of the
hospital surgeon or ship’s master.167 The argument is that the hospital
cannot direct the surgeon as to exactly how to carry out the operation,
it itself lacks that skill. This is however artificial. There is nothing pre-
venting a hospital or health service from laying down exactly how its
employees must work, and the procedures they must follow, or for a
shipping company to direct how its masters must navigate and the
techniques they must use.168 With an independent contractor, this right
is not present. A shipping company cannot tell the harbour pilot how
to conduct his pilotage when in their vessel.169 A second criticism which
has been given of control analysis is that it would result in superior
employees being vicariously liable for subordinate employees.170 This
however does not follow. A company may employ two employees, one
of which it makes the manager of the other. The power and control
a manager has over an inferior employee does not result from the
manager’s relationship with the employee, but rather the employee’s
relationship with their shared employer. Any power or control that
the manager exercises is power delegated to it by the controlling body,
the company. For our twin axes approach delegated control is not a
relevant form of control, we are instead interested in the control that
exists due to an individual’s direct relationship with another.
The twin axes approach gives a coherent account of all forms of
vicarious liability. The place on the chart will determine the question of
liability. The chart however is not an exact science with arbitrary
measurements, instead the positions are relative, and there will of
course be some cases which are difficult to place. The greatest diffi-
culties as with the present law will be at the boundaries. It however
produces a single rational scheme for vicarious liability.171 It is also
superior to the relationship close connection test, in so far as such
a test is an attempt to produce a single rationalised approach to the
167 See for instance Morren v Swinton and Pendlebury BC [1965] 1 W.L.R. 576, 582, per Lord Parker
C.J. Markesinis and Deakin, p. 668, state in the context of the employee/independent contractor
divide that with the increase in specialist skills of employees the ability of an unskilled employer to
control the work has diminished. Whilst critical of it they state that it may be preserved in the form
of a “right to control their work if he possessed the necessary skill”. I argue that this is incorrect, an
employer may control the work whether or not he possesses the necessary skill.
168 E.g. whether to use GPS within sight of land or visual fixing, (amongst many others). Note Zuijs v
Wirth Brothers Pty. Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 561, 571, perDixon C.J., Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ.
“The duties to be performed may depend so much on special skill or knowledge or they may be so
clearly identified or the necessity of the employee acting on his own responsibility may be so
evident, that little room for direction or command in detail may exist. But that is not the point.
What matters is lawful authority to command so far as there is scope for it.”
169 Note The Pilotage Act 1987, s. 16.
170 Op. cit., Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, p. 16.
171 The scheme which provides an account of all categories of vicarious liability does not itself rest on
a rejection of the enterprise liability approach (in either form) to vicarious liability.
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categories of vicarious liability, not only in that it provides greater
guidance, but also through the fact that it recognises that vicarious
liability does not simply look at the strength of association between two
individuals. Instead vicarious liability looks at the strength of associ-
ation between two individuals in the context of a purposeful activity172
assigned by one (A) to the other (B) (or assigned by and to one another,
such as in some unincorporated associations), for the benefit of A, or
in order to achieve A’s objectives. The twin axes ensures that this is
required and do not, for instance, result in vicarious liability for a
parent for their children.
The scheme would not change the end result in Doe or JGE (at
least under Roman Catholic Canon Law). Whilst the relationship
of Bishop/Priest is close to the line, at first instance JGE unlike
Doe downplayed the control that a Bishop had/has over a Priest
by focusing on the Bishop’s lack of a power to dismiss a Priest,173 by
which the Court meant dismiss from the clerical state (a form of laici-
sation, the power is reserved to the Vatican).174 The majority of the
Court of Appeal in JGE disagreed with MacDuff J’s findings on the
level of control175 and found the level of control to be “real and
substantial”.176 A Priest was/is subject to a highly developed disciplin-
ary system and the Bishop did/does have other significant powers
to remove a Priest from his Parish (with cause),177 or to discipline or
172 E.g. the purposeful activity in Lister was looking after the children; in Mattis v Pollock [2003]
EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2158, the purposeful activity was controlling access and
maintaining security.
173 There was a high level of agreement on the part of the Canon Law experts, and MacDuff J.
considered it uncontroversial that (at [29]): “There is effectively no control over priests once
appointed. Within the bounds of canon law, a priest is free to conduct his ministry as he sees fit,
with little or no interference from the bishop, whose role is advisory not supervisory. A bishop has
a duty of vigilance but is not in a position to make requirements or give directions. … The bishop
had no power of dismissal. Dismissal from office would have to be effected through the church in
Rome”. Further “The bishop must exercise Episcopal vigilance. There is clearly some element of
control within this, although there is nothing in the way of penalty or enforcement; the purpose is
to oversee and advise. The bishop may only redeploy the priest in another parish if the latter
consents.” The findings on Canon Law contradicted those made in Doe v Bennett, this was
recognised but not dealt with by MacDuff J. in JGE; it concerned the same Code and system of
Canon Law.
174 The relationship in JGE was under the 1917 Code of Canon Law. Such relationships are now
governed by the 1983 Code of Canon Law. For reduction to the lay state see Can. 211, (Can. 290,
1983 Code), some effects remain since the ordination is not itself invalidated.
175 Para. [126], [134]. per Davis L.J.
176 Para. [134].
177 The Church recognises a sacred hierarchy of clerics, “in which some are subordinated to others”
(Can. 108 · 2 of the 1917 Code, the equivalent provision in the 1983 Code does not state this (Can.
266)). Under Can. 127 (see Can. 273 in the 1983 Code), clerics are obliged to show reverence and
obedience to their own Ordinary (i.e. a Priest reverence/obedience to his Bishop). An Ordinary
cannot transfer without cause an unwilling irremovable Priest without special facilities from the
Apostolic See (note Can. 2163, there is no equivalent provision in the 1983 Code. Under 1983
Code: Can. 1748–1752 there is no need to resort to the Apostolic See). However, under the 1917
Code an Ordinary can remove a removable Priest provided the procedure in Can. 2163–2167 is
followed (see Can. 1748–1752, 1983 Code). Additionally, where there is cause an Ordinary can
remove even an irremovable priest from his Parish (Can. 2147, procedure at Can. 2147–2156;
removable pastors: Can. 2157–2161); (Can. 1740–1747, 1983 Code). An Ordinary could also
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coerce178 him in a number of circumstances, many of these being in
excess of the powers which an ordinary employer would have.179 By
analogy, whilst a Bishop cannot dismiss a Priest from the clerical state,
he can remove the Priest from active ministry or suspend180 him, just as
a hospital can dismiss or suspend a doctor from his position at the
hospital but cannot strike the doctor off the Medical Register, this is
instead for the General Medical Council. Significantly, control is as-
sumed in safeguarding reports relating to the Roman Catholic
Church.181 There are also a number of restrictions on the conduct and
requirements in conduct of a Priest’s day to day life, which few em-
ployees face,182 and a requirement of a uniform.183 A Priest’s discretion
in role varies depending on the function he is exercising. He has sig-
nificant discretion in his evangelic function, and may for instance
evangelise through running a football club or a youth disco, but he has
very little discretion in his liturgical function.184 He may also be granted
a specific function by his Bishop such as vocations director or hospital
chaplain. That these cases often involve sexual abuse may distort our
view as to the applicability of vicarious liability to the relationship of
Bishop/Priest. If a Priest who is appointed Hospital Chaplain by his
Bishop, and whose duties require him to attend the hospital to ad-
minister the sacraments (where his liturgical discretion is minimal) to
Catholic patients, negligently injures a patient during the adminis-
tration of the sacraments, that there should be vicarious liability seems
clear cut.185
It has to be acknowledged that this rationalised model of vicarious
liability will produce some limited expansion to vicarious liability in
immediately deprive a Priest of his parish in certain circumstances, e.g. concubinious Priests (Can.
2176, 2177; no direct equivalent in the 1983 Code, although Can. 1395 provides for suspension).
178 E.g. Can. 2380, clerics or religious carrying on trade/business in breach of Can. 142 “are to be
coerced by the Ordinary with penalties” (now see Can. 1392, 1983 Code).
179 E.g. under Can. 2302, a command or a prohibition about living in a certain place or a relocation to
house of penance, (No direct equivalent in 1983 Code).
180 See Can. 2186 for suspension. Penal provisions on suspension also exist in both Codes.
181 For example the review carried out by Lord Nolan available at http://www.cathcom.org/
mysharedaccounts/cumberlege/finalnolan1.htm, (last accessed 21st February 2012), e.g. at Para
3.5.16.
182 E.g. to display a holy exterior, and interior life (Can. 124; see analogous Can. 276, 1983 Code),
prohibition on marriage/obligation of chastity/celibacy (Can. 132; Can. 277, 1983 Code), to avoid
profane novelties and pseudo-science (Can. 129; Can. 279 ·1, 1983 Code), prohibition on
suretyship without permission of the Ordinary (Can. 137; Can. 285, 1983 Code), no gambling,
hunting, and restrictions on entering taverns, (Can. 138; no such provisions under 1983 Code, but
see Can. 285), obligation to avoid shows, dances, and spectacles, (Can 140; no equivalent in 1983
Code), prohibition on exercising business or trade (Can. 142; Can. 286, 1983 Code now permits
this with permission).
183 Can. 136; (Can. 284, 1983 Code).
184 I.e. A Priest cannot refuse to use the new translation of the Missal into English and instead use the
older translation.
185 In the case of an Extra-Ordinary Minister of Holy Communion, a lay volunteer, who distributes
Holy Communion to the patient, the day to day control over the lay volunteer would in the vast
majority of cases be too weak for vicarious liability to be present. Note also Ward L.J.’s example in
JGE at [83].
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that relationships which have not been previously examined in English
case law will become subject to analysis to see if vicarious liability may
be present. An example of this is the relationship between franchiser
and franchisee. In some cases the balance between day to day control,
and discretion in role will be such that vicarious liability will be present
between the franchisor and franchisee. Tools, equipment and uniforms
may be provided by the franchisor, who in a number of cases will also
advise and support the franchisee, exercising supervision and some
control to ensure that the value of the brand is maintained. The fran-
chisee’s discretion in carrying out the role may be severely limited, and
the franchisee may in some cases be required to perform their role in
accordance to strict instructions and policy to ensure conformity be-
tween different franchisees. Whilst the franchisee will have a separate
legal identity, they are often indistinguishable from the franchisor to
their customers.186
A further example of a potential expansion is in the case of some
PhD students. Whilst not considered “employees” some PhD students,
particularly in the sciences, work on part of a funded project in a way
that may resemble a job. The student may be required to work in the
University’s laboratory, as part of a team, under the instruction of
others, working on the project of their supervisor, and in some cases
the level of discretion in role may be minimal. Control may also be
exercised over the student, in that there may be a dictation of regular
working hours, working location, dress codes, and potential for with-
drawing of funding. These are factors that will need to be considered
when subjecting the relationship between the student and their uni-
versity to the axis test. Some PhD students in the sciences may be in a
relationship to their university sufficient to trigger vicarious liability.
The same factors will of course need to be considered for PhD re-
searchers in the arts and humanities, however, very few are likely to
trigger vicarious liability.
The twin axes scheme which explains the case law and accom-
modates all of the current forms of vicarious liability, is not by itself
incompatible with the notion of enterprise liability, provided a broader
notion of enterprise liability is taken, a non-economic version, which
considers an enterprise as the embarking on a purposive pattern of
conduct with a definite end in view. For adherents to non-economic
enterprise liability theories, this is an association with the enterprise
test.
186 In the United States vicarious liability for franchisees is regularly pleaded, and there can be in
certain circumstances vicarious liability for a franchisee. This vicarious liability is based on a
control based notion of “agency” or “apparent agency”. See J. H. King Jr, “Limiting the Vicarious
Liability of Franchisors for the Torts of Their Franchisees” (2005) 62 Washington & Lee L.
Rev. 417.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The law is mature enough to accept non-contractual employees for
the purposes of vicarious liability. So far the law has tended to attempt
to squeeze non-economic actors into poorly rationalised additional
categories of vicarious liability which are not accounted for in tra-
ditional vicarious liability doctrine. It is now possible to rationalise
these different forms into a single category which accommodates
all present and emerging forms of vicarious liability. The twin axes
of day to day control and discretion in role can encompass all
instances and determine in all circumstances whether a principal
should be vicariously liable for an actor. Unlike the relationship close
connection test the twin axes approach takes into account the fact
that vicarious liability is not simply about associations between in-
dividuals, but rather associations in the context of beneficial purposeful
activities.
Volunteers may work alongside paid employees, carrying out the
same tasks, receiving the same training, and wearing the same uniform.
They may be equally associated with the enterprise as employees. They
may be indistinguishable to members of the public, or consumers of
their services, from the paid employees they work alongside. Writing in
1990 McKendrick suggested that the development of an ‘atypical’
workforce, of the self employed, casual workers, temps, and home-
workers, outside the classic contract of employment, “undermines the
goals served by the doctrine of vicarious liability”.187 To this develop-
ment, and the greater use of subcontracting, can now be added the
expansion of the voluntary sector into the commercial sphere, and also
into the delivery of formerly public services. Voluntary bodies are often
contracted to deliver services on a commercial basis, although the ser-
vice itself may be delivered by unpaid volunteers. A system of vicarious
liability founded on a binary division between employee and indepen-
dent contractor is proving increasingly unsuitable. Courts are masking
their increasing dislike of the binary test of employee/independent
contractor through recourse to these other categories, particularly
agency, and also employer+. The proposed model in this article faces
up to this issue, rationalises these and other emerging categories of
vicarious liability, and deals with and provides a way to assess new
and emerging forms of occupation. In subjecting at least some volun-
teers to the principle of vicarious liability, it is providing them with
a form of protection that their employee colleagues who are often
187 E. McKendrick, “Vicarious Liability and Independent Contractors – A Re-examination” (1990)
53 M.L.R. 770, 784. See also R. Kidner, “Vicarious liability: for whom should the ‘employer’ be
liable?” (1995) 15 Legal Studies 47, 49.
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indistinguishable to outsiders possess. This acceptance of vicarious
liability for at least some volunteers is not out of step with other com-
mon law jurisdictions.188 Giliker considers that vicarious liability will
“continue to evolve and change in accordance with the changing values
of society. … It is not static: this is its strength, not its weakness”.189 It is
submitted that this new rationalisation of the categories is a step in its
evolution.
188 See United States Restatement (Third) of Agency, 2006, which makes provision for the vicarious
liability of volunteers: · 7.07 Employee Acting Within Scope Of Employment, · 7.07 “(3) For
purposes of this section, (a) an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to
control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work, and (b) the fact that work is
performed gratuitously does not relieve a principal of liability.” Note, J. D. Kahn, “Organizations’
Liability for the Torts of Volunteers” (1985) 133(6) U. Pa. L. Rev 1433. See also South Australia
Volunteers Protection Act 2001, s. 5(1).
189 Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort, p. 254
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